The narrative sense of others by Gallagher, Shaun
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - 
Papers Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities 
1-1-2017 
The narrative sense of others 
Shaun Gallagher 
University of Memphis, University of Wollongong, shaung@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers 
 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gallagher, Shaun, "The narrative sense of others" (2017). Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - 
Papers. 3301. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/3301 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
The narrative sense of others 
Abstract 
Comment on Duranti, Alessandro. 2015. The anthropology of intentions: Language in a world of others. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Disciplines 
Arts and Humanities | Law 
Publication Details 
Gallagher, S. (2017). The narrative sense of others. HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, 7 (2), 467-473. 
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/3301 
2017 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 7 (2): 467–473
 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Shaun Gallagher.  
ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau7.2.039
BOOK SYMPOSIUM
The narrative sense of others
Shaun Gallagher, University of Memphis
Comment on Duranti, Alessandro. 2015. The anthropology of 
intentions: Language in a world of others. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Philosophers often point to the role of narrative in supporting judgments of agency 
and evaluative judgments of responsibility in cases of individual action and inten-
tion formation. Very few of them, however, suggest that narrative can play a simi-
lar role in collaborative decision-making and joint or collective action (Gallagher 
and Tollefsen 2017). Rather, philosophical accounts of collective agency and in-
tentionality start by looking inside the heads of the individual participants/group 
members. Thus, for example, Raimo Tuomela (1984: 17) identifies his view of col-
lective intentionality as individualistic and based on the “principle of conceptual 
individualism,” where holistic social concepts are reduced to individualist ones. 
Likewise, John Searle (1990: 407) writes: “collective intentionality, and therefore. . . 
collective behavior, must be consistent with our overall ontology [.  .  . which is] 
based on the existence of indivdual human beings as the repositories of all inten-
tionality, whether individual or collective. . . . We are not required to suppose that 
there is any element in society other than individuals” (see Duranti 2015: 213–14). 
What Searle calls a “we intention” is not the summation of I- or individual inten-
tions; rather, it’s just a special kind of individual intention, e.g., my intention to do 
something together with you.
This is the classic view, as characterized by Hans Bernhard Schmid (2014: 10): 
“Groups exist in virtue of the participants’ [individual] beliefs that the groups ex-
ist.” On this view, as Schmid suggests: “there is an air of mystery about the idea of 
a collective subject [or ‘we’]” (2014: 11). This motivates the question of whether 
anything in joint action or collaboration goes beyond just individual mental states, 
or additive aspects of the individual agents.
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One strategy is to base the “we” or collective sense of intention on a shared 
sense of joint agency as Pacherie (2014) suggests. But Pacherie also argues that the 
sense (experience) of joint agency is to be found in the individual, not at a super-
individual level of group mind. In this case, I have a sense that we are working 
together; you have a sense that we are working together; so we have a sense that we 
are working together. The overall ontology is still limited to a plurality of individual 
minds. If, however, we look closer, I think we can see something that goes beyond 
conceptual individualism.
Pacherie (2014) agrees that an individual’s sense of agency is based on a com-
plex of multiple factors that involve intention formation (see Gallagher 2012a). 
Let’s consider her threefold distinction between different kinds of intentions.
•	  Motor, or M-intentions, are specified in motor-control detail as I move toward 
a goal 
•	  Proximate, or P-intentions, are specified in environment-related perceptual 
predictions and feedback for the immediate guidance of ongoing action 
•	  Distal, or D-intentions, are prior intentions specified in a reflective (prospec-
tive) process of deliberation and intention formation 
Here is an example, in the plural. My wife and I engage in a conversation where 
we deliberate and decide to buy a new car next week (this is the formation of a 
D-intention). Next week arrives and we head out to the auto dealer, we walk around 
kicking some tires, and then sit down and sign a contract, etc. Our actions can 
be described in term of fulfilling P-intentions (transporting ourselves to the auto 
dealer, kicking the tires). All of this movement we are engaged in is specified in its 
details by M-intentions (extending a leg to kick; using a hand to sign). One can add 
retrospective evaluation which may reinforce our respective senses of agency for 
what we did.
Do any of these factors contribute to something more than an individual sense 
of joint agency? I think it depends on the type of joint action at stake. Consider 
three different types of joint action.
•	  Ad hoc emergent joint action, e.g., we’re standing close by, the music starts 
and I grab you and start dancing. This kind of joint action depends on low-level 
motoric/perceptual processes involving M- and P-intentions.
•	  Planned joint action to accomplish some short-term goal, here and now: for 
example, we consider the position of a table and then move it to the next room. 
There are P- and M-intentions involved, and perhaps a relatively undeveloped 
D-intention.
•	  Planned coordinated project: this involves longer-term, distributed processes 
that require the formation of detailed D-intentions, prospective planning, and 
ongoing retrospective review to keep track of complex, articulated actions.
There are two ways that a sense of agency may involve something more than just 
individual experiences or mental states. In the first case, if our dancing involves 
synchronous movements, our interactions may form at the level of basic M-inten-
tions, what Soliman and Glenberg (2014) have called a “joint body schema.” In their 
study, two participants coordinate for five minutes by moving a flexible wire back 
and forth to cut through a candle. This requires close synchronous coordination. 
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Soliman and Glenberg show that, just as in the case of tool use where both neu-
roscientific and behavioral measures show that one’s peripersonal space extends 
to the end of the tool (Maravita and Iriki 2004), one’s peripersonal space extends 
to include the other person as one is engaged in such interaction. There are two 
interpretations of these results. (1) A process in the individual involving one’s body 
schema/peripersonal space expands; and the other person’s body schema does so 
too. These are subpersonal changes that may generate or modulate an individual 
sense of joint agency—a feeling of being in sync with the other. (2) Two bodies act-
ing together form a larger action system, so the joint body schema belongs only to 
this larger system (two parts constituting a larger whole). Like the tango, the phe-
nomenon emerges only in a process that goes beyond the individual actors. Clearly, 
this phenomenon, operating at the level of M-intentions, is limited to synchronous 
interaction—not all joint action involves this type of interaction.
What about the level of P-intentions? Is there anything that might count as 
more than an individual factor. Searle (1983) indicates that P-intentions, which 
may specify a common goal, do not specify the means in the same way and are 
agent individuating—they cannot be the same for you and me, precisely because 
two embodied agents are not embedded in the environment in the same way. Ac-
cordingly, action specifications at the level of P-intention will not be shared. For the 
purposes of this short comment, let’s accept this view. I think the more interesting 
process happens on the level of the D-intention.
In regard to planning out a long-term project or short-term joint action, 
prospective deliberation or reflective thinking (e.g., in the context of forming 
D-intentions or planning out how to do things) can be a social process, as in the 
case of my wife and I deliberating about buying a new car. We can reflect together 
via communicative actions, about what we want to do, or about how we should go 
about doing it. What my initial individual intention might have been can change 
through this communicative process into an intention that is not reducible to 
just my or your individual intention. There’s no problem here of speaking about a 
collectively formed intention. But we can ask, “where” does a collectively formed 
intention reside? In our individual minds? Or in what can be called a socially 
extended mind, or institution (Gallagher 2013), or what Alessandro Duranti 
(2015) calls a socially distributed cognition (Duranti 2015: 219). Such institutions 
go beyond individual cognitive processes or habits: they include communica-
tive practices, and more established institutions include rituals and traditions 
that generate actions, preserve memories, solve problems. These are distributed 
processes supported by artifacts, tools, technologies, environments, institutional 
structures, etc. 
And narrative. Narrative plays an important role here, since it is rare that joint 
actions are conducted on the basis of lists or instructions. It is possible that we 
could follow a set of instructions, but typically we would want to know why we 
are doing so, or at least where our actions are leading. Narratives address the why 
question as well as the how question. Clearly, our retrospective evaluations of our 
actions take the form of narrative; so do our prospective deliberations. What are we 
going to do, and why are we doing it?
There are developed discussions of the use of narratives in the case of individual 
deliberation, intention formation, and retrospective attribution and evaluation of 
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actions. Graham and Stephens (1994), for example, suggest the individual sense of 
agency originates in retrospective attribution—understanding this in terms of “our 
proclivity for constructing self-referential narratives,” which allow us to explain 
our behavior retrospectively, which reinforces our sense of agency (1994: 101). 
David Velleman (2007) suggests that narrative acts as a framework for testing one’s 
D-intention formation, a concept he calls “narrative authorship.” On this view, nar-
rative is a means of self-governing (supporting individual autonomy). In the indi-
vidual this involves reflective (or narrative) distance, and it allows for what Charles 
Taylor (1989) calls strong evaluation.
Narratives are social products. They emerge relatively early in development 
and in circumstances involving child’s play they lead to we-narratives (Nelson 
2003). Narratives also assist in helping us understand others (Gallagher and 
Hutto 2008); and they exist not only in vocalizations, but in media that go be-
yond individuals—in texts and documents, etc. Duranti is quite explicit about 
various elements of distributed cognition, and he rightly indicates: “in coordi-
nating our actions with others, as, for example, when we are engaged in a joint 
activity, we do not have to hold everything in our mind in order to execute a giv-
en task or engage in a given activity” (Duranti 2015: 220). Distributed cognition 
means the distribution of knowledge throughout environments—instructions, 
instruments, other people, etc., Gibsonian affordances; Goodwin’s semiotic re-
sources; Searle’s “Background”; Bourdieu’s habitus. Yes to all of this, but I want 
to add, narratives too.
Throughout The anthropology of intentions, Duranti makes extensive and ex-
cellent use of narratives as an evidence source about various practices in differ-
ent cultures, including his analysis of jazz improvisation (e.g., p. 226); yet, in his 
considerations of intentionality and intersubjectivity, he doesn’t mention the way 
narrative can work as part of distributed cognition, or in contexts of collective in-
tentionality and group agency. It may be that he simply assumes this, but I think it 
is worth explicating. In this respect his analysis can be extended with the addition 
of narrative. 
Specifically it is possible to show that narrative practices can lead to a collec-
tive sense of joint agency (in ways that go beyond simply the sharing of individual 
mental events); they can help to shape group identity; they can solve problems 
of stability of intentions and projects across time; they can provide resources for 
problem solving; and provide ways to track progress toward a goal. A focus on nar-
ratives could also flesh out Duranti’s critique of Searle, even as it could help to ex-
plain concepts like “Background” and habitus. Rather than rehearsing these issues 
(see Gallagher and Tollefsen 2017; Tollefsen and Gallagher 2017 for discussion), let 
me focus on one issue that is of significant concern to Duranti. 
Collective or shared intentionality can lead to the formation of in-group/out-
group opposition. An “increase of sociality toward some members turns out to be a 
reduction of sociality toward other” (219). This is the “dark side” (231) of such so-
cial phenomena. “Being able to empathize, exchange places, and understand each 
other also feed social conformity, lack of authenticity, the acceptance of the locally 
sanctioned prestige—what Gramsci … called ‘hegemony’—and ultimately, the re-
production of the status quo” (231). Duranti points to discussions of these issues 
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in classic phenomenology; he could well point to ongoing debates (e.g., Gallagher 
2012b, 2014; Maibom 2014; Prinz 2011). These same issues are reflected in consid-
erations about narrative. 
In contexts of institutional evaluation or action justification, one might chal-
lenge the idea that narrative is the right thing to be looking at since a group’s nar-
rative may be nothing more than PR, a smoke screen, or propaganda—deceptive 
and not reflective of the real identity of the group. There is a deeper issue: to the 
extent that the instituted narrative, even if formed over time by many individuals, 
transcends those individuals and may persist beyond them, it may loop around 
to constrain or dominate the group members or the group as a whole. Collective 
(institutional, corporate) narratives often take on a life (an autonomy) of their own 
and may come to oppose or undermine the intentions of the individual members. 
Narrative practices in both extended institutional and collective structures and 
practices can be positive in allowing us to see certain possibilities, but at the same 
time, they can carry our cognitive processes and social interactions in specific di-
rections and blind us to other possibilities.
Structures supported by narratives can play a dominating role in bureaucratic 
systems, democratic processes, and in an extensive range of social, legal, and po-
litical practices. Narratives, in supporting the formation of institutions, traditions, 
practices, etc., can be rigid protectors of the status quo, promoters of corporate and 
nationalist interests, and hinder innovative thinking. For this reason some critical 
theorists (e.g., Habermas 1987) are suspicious of narrative.
Given its conservative nature, the question is whether narrative can be critical 
in the sense of providing reflective resources to generate new or different possibili-
ties. Can narratives be both keepers of memory, and also represent the blueprints 
of change? 
Indeed, it is not clear how one could generate new or different possibilities 
without employing narrative. From a critical perspective, we may need to look 
for hidden narratives; we may have to struggle to tell an alternative story. In do-
ing so, we may want to give more weight to what Striblen (2013) calls externally 
constructed narratives, i.e., narratives by people outside of the group or institution 
from a perspective that can allow for more distance from a group’s own narrated 
actions.
A critical use of narrative, then, would allow for attaining a critical distance 
essential to effecting a strong evaluation. Narrative allows for the possibility of 
taking a critical look at how social and cultural practices either productively ex-
tend or, in some cases, curtail collective processes and shape our intersubjective 
relations.
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